Yes he should resign for the following reasons: 
1} Failure to protect Israel from being attacked [Mr. Security" image shattered: Many Israelis hold Netanyahu responsible for intelligence and security failures that preceded the October 7, 2023, attack, which occurred under his watch. His long-cultivated image as "Mr. Security" was severely damaged.Ignoring warnings: Reports indicate that Netanyahu had received detailed intelligence about Hamas's plans for years but opted against pre-emptive strikes. A civilian inquiry board also criticized his government's "arrogance" and failure to act on warnings.]
2) Failure to destroy/expel hamas and deport the PLO from Gaza and Judea and Samaria [Military dissent: The Israeli military has openly contradicted Netanyahu's public claims that Hamas can be completely destroyed. Senior officials have stated that eliminating the group is an unrealistic goal and that it will remain in Gaza without a political solution. While his government has advanced a major settlement expansion plan in Judea and Samaria (the West Bank). In September 2025, Netanyahu signed an agreement to build 3,400 new homes, aiming to double the Israeli population in the Ma'ale Adumim settlement. Reports on Benjamin Netanyahu indicate he has not taken steps to forcibly deport the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) from Judea and Samaria (the West Bank). This inaction has been a point of criticism for some, who view it as a weakness or reluctance to decisively address the ongoing conflict.]
3) Failure to rebuild Jewish settlements in Gaza; Sanai [Although Netanyahu's current far-right coalition includes ministers who support rebuilding settlements in Gaza, Netanyahu has publicly stated that his government has no intention of permanently occupying or resettling Gaza. However, some reports indicate that he and other government officials have discussed plans to establish a military presence in Gaza.]
4 The only practical results of his actions will be setting up Israel for more October 7 attacks.[Analyses by journalists and regional experts suggest that certain policies and actions by Benjamin Netanyahu and his government, both before and since October 7, 2023, could increase the long-term risk of similar attacks. These analyses point to specific policy choices that may have had unintended or detrimental effects on Israel's security, including its strategy toward Hamas, actions in the West Bank, and internal political dynamics.
Pre-October 7 policies
Encouraging Hamas to remain in power: For years, Netanyahu's governments allowed and encouraged the transfer of funds from Qatar to Gaza to prop up Hamas. Critics argue this was done to maintain the division between Hamas in Gaza and the Fatah-controlled Palestinian Authority (PA) in the West Bank, undermining efforts toward a two-state solution. This strategy, meant to manage the conflict rather than resolve it, ultimately strengthened Hamas.
eakened Deterrence: The October 7 attack already demonstrated a major intelligence and operational failure, and the prolonged and inconclusive nature of the war in Gaza may further erode Israel's deterrence posture.
Empowering extremist groups: A failure to resolve the underlying issues of the conflict, combined with the immense suffering in Gaza, could fuel radicalization and create more fertile ground for future attacks.
1} Failure to protect Israel from being attacked [Mr. Security" image shattered: Many Israelis hold Netanyahu responsible for intelligence and security failures that preceded the October 7, 2023, attack, which occurred under his watch. His long-cultivated image as "Mr. Security" was severely damaged.Ignoring warnings: Reports indicate that Netanyahu had received detailed intelligence about Hamas's plans for years but opted against pre-emptive strikes. A civilian inquiry board also criticized his government's "arrogance" and failure to act on warnings.]
2) Failure to destroy/expel hamas and deport the PLO from Gaza and Judea and Samaria [Military dissent: The Israeli military has openly contradicted Netanyahu's public claims that Hamas can be completely destroyed. Senior officials have stated that eliminating the group is an unrealistic goal and that it will remain in Gaza without a political solution. While his government has advanced a major settlement expansion plan in Judea and Samaria (the West Bank). In September 2025, Netanyahu signed an agreement to build 3,400 new homes, aiming to double the Israeli population in the Ma'ale Adumim settlement. Reports on Benjamin Netanyahu indicate he has not taken steps to forcibly deport the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) from Judea and Samaria (the West Bank). This inaction has been a point of criticism for some, who view it as a weakness or reluctance to decisively address the ongoing conflict.]
3) Failure to rebuild Jewish settlements in Gaza; Sanai [Although Netanyahu's current far-right coalition includes ministers who support rebuilding settlements in Gaza, Netanyahu has publicly stated that his government has no intention of permanently occupying or resettling Gaza. However, some reports indicate that he and other government officials have discussed plans to establish a military presence in Gaza.]
4 The only practical results of his actions will be setting up Israel for more October 7 attacks.[Analyses by journalists and regional experts suggest that certain policies and actions by Benjamin Netanyahu and his government, both before and since October 7, 2023, could increase the long-term risk of similar attacks. These analyses point to specific policy choices that may have had unintended or detrimental effects on Israel's security, including its strategy toward Hamas, actions in the West Bank, and internal political dynamics.
Pre-October 7 policies
Encouraging Hamas to remain in power: For years, Netanyahu's governments allowed and encouraged the transfer of funds from Qatar to Gaza to prop up Hamas. Critics argue this was done to maintain the division between Hamas in Gaza and the Fatah-controlled Palestinian Authority (PA) in the West Bank, undermining efforts toward a two-state solution. This strategy, meant to manage the conflict rather than resolve it, ultimately strengthened Hamas.
eakened Deterrence: The October 7 attack already demonstrated a major intelligence and operational failure, and the prolonged and inconclusive nature of the war in Gaza may further erode Israel's deterrence posture.
Empowering extremist groups: A failure to resolve the underlying issues of the conflict, combined with the immense suffering in Gaza, could fuel radicalization and create more fertile ground for future attacks.